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- From 6c5be116dd6997f68e524247751cff53c74519d7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
- From: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
- Date: Mon, 19 May 2014 23:26:43 +0300
- Subject: [PATCH] PKCS #1: Enforce minimum padding for decryption in
- internal TLS
- Follow the PKCS #1 v1.5, 8.1 constraint of at least eight octets long PS
- for the case where the internal TLS implementation decrypts PKCS #1
- formatted data. Similar limit was already in place for signature
- validation, but not for this decryption routine.
- Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
- ---
- src/tls/pkcs1.c | 5 +++++
- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
- diff --git a/src/tls/pkcs1.c b/src/tls/pkcs1.c
- index af58a42987c6..ea3e6171a1d1 100644
- --- a/src/tls/pkcs1.c
- +++ b/src/tls/pkcs1.c
- @@ -113,6 +113,11 @@ int pkcs1_v15_private_key_decrypt(struct crypto_rsa_key *key,
- pos++;
- if (pos == end)
- return -1;
- + if (pos - out - 2 < 8) {
- + /* PKCS #1 v1.5, 8.1: At least eight octets long PS */
- + wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "LibTomCrypt: Too short padding");
- + return -1;
- + }
- pos++;
-
- *outlen -= pos - out;
- --
- 2.0.0.rc2
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