package/python3: add upstream post-3.13.5 security fix for CVE-2025-8194

Fixes the following vulnerability:

CVE-2025-8194: There is a defect in the CPython “tarfile” module affecting
the “TarFile” extraction and entry enumeration APIs.  The tar implementation
would process tar archives with negative offsets without error, resulting in
an infinite loop and deadlock during the parsing of maliciously crafted tar
archives.

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-8194
https://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2025/07/28/1

Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
Signed-off-by: Julien Olivain <ju.o@free.fr>

package/python3/0009-3.13-gh-130577-tarfile-now-validates-archives-to-ens.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,221 @@
+From cdae923ffe187d6ef916c0f665a31249619193fe Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: "Miss Islington (bot)"
+ <31488909+miss-islington@users.noreply.github.com>
+Date: Mon, 28 Jul 2025 17:59:33 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] [3.13] gh-130577: tarfile now validates archives to ensure
+ member offsets are non-negative (GH-137027) (#137170)
+
+gh-130577: tarfile now validates archives to ensure member offsets are non-negative (GH-137027)
+(cherry picked from commit 7040aa54f14676938970e10c5f74ea93cd56aa38)
+
+Upstream: https://github.com/python/cpython/commit/cdae923ffe187d6ef916c0f665a31249619193fe
+Co-authored-by: Alexander Urieles <aeurielesn@users.noreply.github.com>
+Co-authored-by: Gregory P. Smith <greg@krypto.org>
+Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
+---
+ Lib/tarfile.py                                |   3 +
+ Lib/test/test_tarfile.py                      | 156 ++++++++++++++++++
+ ...-07-23-00-35-29.gh-issue-130577.c7EITy.rst |   3 +
+ 3 files changed, 162 insertions(+)
+ create mode 100644 Misc/NEWS.d/next/Library/2025-07-23-00-35-29.gh-issue-130577.c7EITy.rst
+
+diff --git a/Lib/tarfile.py b/Lib/tarfile.py
+index 0980f6a8175..9ff9df696de 100755
+--- a/Lib/tarfile.py
++++ b/Lib/tarfile.py
+@@ -1636,6 +1636,9 @@ def _block(self, count):
+         """Round up a byte count by BLOCKSIZE and return it,
+            e.g. _block(834) => 1024.
+         """
++        # Only non-negative offsets are allowed
++        if count < 0:
++            raise InvalidHeaderError("invalid offset")
+         blocks, remainder = divmod(count, BLOCKSIZE)
+         if remainder:
+             blocks += 1
+diff --git a/Lib/test/test_tarfile.py b/Lib/test/test_tarfile.py
+index ac31be0f050..7024be46de5 100644
+--- a/Lib/test/test_tarfile.py
++++ b/Lib/test/test_tarfile.py
+@@ -50,6 +50,7 @@ def sha256sum(data):
+ xzname = os.path.join(TEMPDIR, "testtar.tar.xz")
+ tmpname = os.path.join(TEMPDIR, "tmp.tar")
+ dotlessname = os.path.join(TEMPDIR, "testtar")
++SPACE = b" "
+ 
+ sha256_regtype = (
+     "e09e4bc8b3c9d9177e77256353b36c159f5f040531bbd4b024a8f9b9196c71ce"
+@@ -4578,6 +4579,161 @@ def extractall(self, ar):
+         ar.extractall(self.testdir, filter='fully_trusted')
+ 
+ 
++class OffsetValidationTests(unittest.TestCase):
++    tarname = tmpname
++    invalid_posix_header = (
++        # name: 100 bytes
++        tarfile.NUL * tarfile.LENGTH_NAME
++        # mode, space, null terminator: 8 bytes
++        + b"000755" + SPACE + tarfile.NUL
++        # uid, space, null terminator: 8 bytes
++        + b"000001" + SPACE + tarfile.NUL
++        # gid, space, null terminator: 8 bytes
++        + b"000001" + SPACE + tarfile.NUL
++        # size, space: 12 bytes
++        + b"\xff" * 11 + SPACE
++        # mtime, space: 12 bytes
++        + tarfile.NUL * 11 + SPACE
++        # chksum: 8 bytes
++        + b"0011407" + tarfile.NUL
++        # type: 1 byte
++        + tarfile.REGTYPE
++        # linkname: 100 bytes
++        + tarfile.NUL * tarfile.LENGTH_LINK
++        # magic: 6 bytes, version: 2 bytes
++        + tarfile.POSIX_MAGIC
++        # uname: 32 bytes
++        + tarfile.NUL * 32
++        # gname: 32 bytes
++        + tarfile.NUL * 32
++        # devmajor, space, null terminator: 8 bytes
++        + tarfile.NUL * 6 + SPACE + tarfile.NUL
++        # devminor, space, null terminator: 8 bytes
++        + tarfile.NUL * 6 + SPACE + tarfile.NUL
++        # prefix: 155 bytes
++        + tarfile.NUL * tarfile.LENGTH_PREFIX
++        # padding: 12 bytes
++        + tarfile.NUL * 12
++    )
++    invalid_gnu_header = (
++        # name: 100 bytes
++        tarfile.NUL * tarfile.LENGTH_NAME
++        # mode, null terminator: 8 bytes
++        + b"0000755" + tarfile.NUL
++        # uid, null terminator: 8 bytes
++        + b"0000001" + tarfile.NUL
++        # gid, space, null terminator: 8 bytes
++        + b"0000001" + tarfile.NUL
++        # size, space: 12 bytes
++        + b"\xff" * 11 + SPACE
++        # mtime, space: 12 bytes
++        + tarfile.NUL * 11 + SPACE
++        # chksum: 8 bytes
++        + b"0011327" + tarfile.NUL
++        # type: 1 byte
++        + tarfile.REGTYPE
++        # linkname: 100 bytes
++        + tarfile.NUL * tarfile.LENGTH_LINK
++        # magic: 8 bytes
++        + tarfile.GNU_MAGIC
++        # uname: 32 bytes
++        + tarfile.NUL * 32
++        # gname: 32 bytes
++        + tarfile.NUL * 32
++        # devmajor, null terminator: 8 bytes
++        + tarfile.NUL * 8
++        # devminor, null terminator: 8 bytes
++        + tarfile.NUL * 8
++        # padding: 167 bytes
++        + tarfile.NUL * 167
++    )
++    invalid_v7_header = (
++        # name: 100 bytes
++        tarfile.NUL * tarfile.LENGTH_NAME
++        # mode, space, null terminator: 8 bytes
++        + b"000755" + SPACE + tarfile.NUL
++        # uid, space, null terminator: 8 bytes
++        + b"000001" + SPACE + tarfile.NUL
++        # gid, space, null terminator: 8 bytes
++        + b"000001" + SPACE + tarfile.NUL
++        # size, space: 12 bytes
++        + b"\xff" * 11 + SPACE
++        # mtime, space: 12 bytes
++        + tarfile.NUL * 11 + SPACE
++        # chksum: 8 bytes
++        + b"0010070" + tarfile.NUL
++        # type: 1 byte
++        + tarfile.REGTYPE
++        # linkname: 100 bytes
++        + tarfile.NUL * tarfile.LENGTH_LINK
++        # padding: 255 bytes
++        + tarfile.NUL * 255
++    )
++    valid_gnu_header = tarfile.TarInfo("filename").tobuf(tarfile.GNU_FORMAT)
++    data_block = b"\xff" * tarfile.BLOCKSIZE
++
++    def _write_buffer(self, buffer):
++        with open(self.tarname, "wb") as f:
++            f.write(buffer)
++
++    def _get_members(self, ignore_zeros=None):
++        with open(self.tarname, "rb") as f:
++            with tarfile.open(
++                mode="r", fileobj=f, ignore_zeros=ignore_zeros
++            ) as tar:
++                return tar.getmembers()
++
++    def _assert_raises_read_error_exception(self):
++        with self.assertRaisesRegex(
++            tarfile.ReadError, "file could not be opened successfully"
++        ):
++            self._get_members()
++
++    def test_invalid_offset_header_validations(self):
++        for tar_format, invalid_header in (
++            ("posix", self.invalid_posix_header),
++            ("gnu", self.invalid_gnu_header),
++            ("v7", self.invalid_v7_header),
++        ):
++            with self.subTest(format=tar_format):
++                self._write_buffer(invalid_header)
++                self._assert_raises_read_error_exception()
++
++    def test_early_stop_at_invalid_offset_header(self):
++        buffer = self.valid_gnu_header + self.invalid_gnu_header + self.valid_gnu_header
++        self._write_buffer(buffer)
++        members = self._get_members()
++        self.assertEqual(len(members), 1)
++        self.assertEqual(members[0].name, "filename")
++        self.assertEqual(members[0].offset, 0)
++
++    def test_ignore_invalid_archive(self):
++        # 3 invalid headers with their respective data
++        buffer = (self.invalid_gnu_header + self.data_block) * 3
++        self._write_buffer(buffer)
++        members = self._get_members(ignore_zeros=True)
++        self.assertEqual(len(members), 0)
++
++    def test_ignore_invalid_offset_headers(self):
++        for first_block, second_block, expected_offset in (
++            (
++                (self.valid_gnu_header),
++                (self.invalid_gnu_header + self.data_block),
++                0,
++            ),
++            (
++                (self.invalid_gnu_header + self.data_block),
++                (self.valid_gnu_header),
++                1024,
++            ),
++        ):
++            self._write_buffer(first_block + second_block)
++            members = self._get_members(ignore_zeros=True)
++            self.assertEqual(len(members), 1)
++            self.assertEqual(members[0].name, "filename")
++            self.assertEqual(members[0].offset, expected_offset)
++
++
+ def setUpModule():
+     os_helper.unlink(TEMPDIR)
+     os.makedirs(TEMPDIR)
+diff --git a/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Library/2025-07-23-00-35-29.gh-issue-130577.c7EITy.rst b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Library/2025-07-23-00-35-29.gh-issue-130577.c7EITy.rst
+new file mode 100644
+index 00000000000..342cabbc865
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Library/2025-07-23-00-35-29.gh-issue-130577.c7EITy.rst
+@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
++:mod:`tarfile` now validates archives to ensure member offsets are
++non-negative.  (Contributed by Alexander Enrique Urieles Nieto in
++:gh:`130577`.)
+-- 
+2.39.5
+

package/python3/python3.mk

@@ -13,6 +13,9 @@ PYTHON3_LICENSE_FILES = LICENSE
 PYTHON3_CPE_ID_VENDOR = python
 PYTHON3_CPE_ID_PRODUCT = python
 
+# 0009-3.13-gh-130577-tarfile-now-validates-archives-to-ens.patch
+PYTHON3_IGNORE_CVES += CVE-2025-8194
+
 # This host Python is installed in $(HOST_DIR), as it is needed when
 # cross-compiling third-party Python modules.