quagga: add upstream security fixes

Fixes the following security issues:

CVE-2018-5378

    It was discovered that the Quagga BGP daemon, bgpd, does not
    properly bounds check data sent with a NOTIFY to a peer, if an
    attribute length is invalid. A configured BGP peer can take
    advantage of this bug to read memory from the bgpd process or cause
    a denial of service (daemon crash).

    https://www.quagga.net/security/Quagga-2018-0543.txt

CVE-2018-5379

    It was discovered that the Quagga BGP daemon, bgpd, can double-free
    memory when processing certain forms of UPDATE message, containing
    cluster-list and/or unknown attributes, resulting in a denial of
    service (bgpd daemon crash).

    https://www.quagga.net/security/Quagga-2018-1114.txt

CVE-2018-5380

    It was discovered that the Quagga BGP daemon, bgpd, does not
    properly handle internal BGP code-to-string conversion tables.

    https://www.quagga.net/security/Quagga-2018-1550.txt

CVE-2018-5381

    It was discovered that the Quagga BGP daemon, bgpd, can enter an
    infinite loop if sent an invalid OPEN message by a configured peer.
    A configured peer can take advantage of this flaw to cause a denial
    of service (bgpd daemon not responding to any other events; BGP
    sessions will drop and not be reestablished; unresponsive CLI
    interface).

    https://www.quagga.net/security/Quagga-2018-1975.txt

Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
(cherry picked from commit 157a198d304224c12fa0d91d977a6619d021f5c6)
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>

package/quagga/0005-bgpd-security-invalid-attr-length-sends-NOTIFY-with-.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
+From cc2e6770697e343f4af534114ab7e633d5beabec Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Paul Jakma <paul@jakma.org>
+Date: Wed, 3 Jan 2018 23:57:33 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] bgpd/security: invalid attr length sends NOTIFY with data
+ overrun
+
+Security issue: Quagga-2018-0543
+
+See: https://www.quagga.net/security/Quagga-2018-0543.txt
+
+* bgpd/bgp_attr.c: (bgp_attr_parse) An invalid attribute length is correctly
+  checked, and a NOTIFY prepared.  The NOTIFY can include the incorrect
+  received data with the NOTIFY, for debug purposes.  Commit
+  c69698704806a9ac5 modified the code to do that just, and also send the
+  malformed attr with the NOTIFY.  However, the invalid attribute length was
+  used as the length of the data to send back.
+
+  The result is a read past the end of data, which is then written to the
+  NOTIFY message and sent to the peer.
+
+  A configured BGP peer can use this bug to read up to 64 KiB of memory from
+  the bgpd process, or crash the process if the invalid read is caught by
+  some means (unmapped page and SEGV, or other mechanism) resulting in a DoS.
+
+  This bug _ought_ /not/ be exploitable by anything other than the connected
+  BGP peer, assuming the underlying TCP transport is secure.  For no BGP
+  peer should send on an UPDATE with this attribute.  Quagga will not, as
+  Quagga always validates the attr header length, regardless of type.
+
+  However, it is possible that there are BGP implementations that do not
+  check lengths on some attributes (e.g.  optional/transitive ones of a type
+  they do not recognise), and might pass such malformed attrs on.  If such
+  implementations exists and are common, then this bug might be triggerable
+  by BGP speakers further hops away.  Those peers will not receive the
+  NOTIFY (unless they sit on a shared medium), however they might then be
+  able to trigger a DoS.
+
+  Fix: use the valid bound to calculate the length.
+
+Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
+---
+ bgpd/bgp_attr.c | 4 +++-
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/bgpd/bgp_attr.c b/bgpd/bgp_attr.c
+index ef58beb1..9564637e 100644
+--- a/bgpd/bgp_attr.c
++++ b/bgpd/bgp_attr.c
+@@ -2147,6 +2147,8 @@ bgp_attr_parse (struct peer *peer, struct attr *attr, bgp_size_t size,
+   memset (seen, 0, BGP_ATTR_BITMAP_SIZE);
+ 
+   /* End pointer of BGP attribute. */
++  assert (size <= stream_get_size (BGP_INPUT (peer)));
++  assert (size <= stream_get_endp (BGP_INPUT (peer)));
+   endp = BGP_INPUT_PNT (peer) + size;
+   
+   /* Get attributes to the end of attribute length. */
+@@ -2228,7 +2230,7 @@ bgp_attr_parse (struct peer *peer, struct attr *attr, bgp_size_t size,
+           bgp_notify_send_with_data (peer,
+                                      BGP_NOTIFY_UPDATE_ERR,
+                                      BGP_NOTIFY_UPDATE_ATTR_LENG_ERR,
+-                                     startp, attr_endp - startp);
++                                     startp, endp - startp);
+ 	  return BGP_ATTR_PARSE_ERROR;
+ 	}
+ 	
+-- 
+2.11.0
+

package/quagga/0006-bgpd-security-Fix-double-free-of-unknown-attribute.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,112 @@
+From e69b535f92eafb599329bf725d9b4c6fd5d7fded Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Paul Jakma <paul@jakma.org>
+Date: Sat, 6 Jan 2018 19:52:10 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] bgpd/security: Fix double free of unknown attribute
+
+Security issue: Quagga-2018-1114
+See: https://www.quagga.net/security/Quagga-2018-1114.txt
+
+It is possible for bgpd to double-free an unknown attribute. This can happen
+via bgp_update_receive receiving an UPDATE with an invalid unknown attribute.
+bgp_update_receive then will call bgp_attr_unintern_sub and bgp_attr_flush,
+and the latter may try free an already freed unknown attr.
+
+* bgpd/bgp_attr.c: (transit_unintern) Take a pointer to the caller's storage
+  for the (struct transit *), so that transit_unintern can NULL out the
+  caller's reference if the (struct transit) is freed.
+  (cluster_unintern) By inspection, appears to have a similar issue.
+  (bgp_attr_unintern_sub) adjust for above.
+
+Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
+---
+ bgpd/bgp_attr.c | 33 +++++++++++++++++++--------------
+ bgpd/bgp_attr.h |  4 ++--
+ 2 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/bgpd/bgp_attr.c b/bgpd/bgp_attr.c
+index 9564637e..0c2806b5 100644
+--- a/bgpd/bgp_attr.c
++++ b/bgpd/bgp_attr.c
+@@ -199,15 +199,17 @@ cluster_intern (struct cluster_list *cluster)
+ }
+ 
+ void
+-cluster_unintern (struct cluster_list *cluster)
++cluster_unintern (struct cluster_list **cluster)
+ {
+-  if (cluster->refcnt)
+-    cluster->refcnt--;
++  struct cluster_list *c = *cluster;
++  if (c->refcnt)
++    c->refcnt--;
+ 
+-  if (cluster->refcnt == 0)
++  if (c->refcnt == 0)
+     {
+-      hash_release (cluster_hash, cluster);
+-      cluster_free (cluster);
++      hash_release (cluster_hash, c);
++      cluster_free (c);
++      *cluster = NULL;
+     }
+ }
+ 
+@@ -357,15 +359,18 @@ transit_intern (struct transit *transit)
+ }
+ 
+ void
+-transit_unintern (struct transit *transit)
++transit_unintern (struct transit **transit)
+ {
+-  if (transit->refcnt)
+-    transit->refcnt--;
++  struct transit *t = *transit;
++  
++  if (t->refcnt)
++    t->refcnt--;
+ 
+-  if (transit->refcnt == 0)
++  if (t->refcnt == 0)
+     {
+-      hash_release (transit_hash, transit);
+-      transit_free (transit);
++      hash_release (transit_hash, t);
++      transit_free (t);
++      *transit = NULL;
+     }
+ }
+ 
+@@ -820,11 +825,11 @@ bgp_attr_unintern_sub (struct attr *attr)
+       UNSET_FLAG(attr->flag, ATTR_FLAG_BIT (BGP_ATTR_LARGE_COMMUNITIES));
+       
+       if (attr->extra->cluster)
+-        cluster_unintern (attr->extra->cluster);
++        cluster_unintern (&attr->extra->cluster);
+       UNSET_FLAG(attr->flag, ATTR_FLAG_BIT (BGP_ATTR_CLUSTER_LIST));
+       
+       if (attr->extra->transit)
+-        transit_unintern (attr->extra->transit);
++        transit_unintern (&attr->extra->transit);
+     }
+ }
+ 
+diff --git a/bgpd/bgp_attr.h b/bgpd/bgp_attr.h
+index 9ff074b2..052acc7d 100644
+--- a/bgpd/bgp_attr.h
++++ b/bgpd/bgp_attr.h
+@@ -187,10 +187,10 @@ extern unsigned long int attr_unknown_count (void);
+ 
+ /* Cluster list prototypes. */
+ extern int cluster_loop_check (struct cluster_list *, struct in_addr);
+-extern void cluster_unintern (struct cluster_list *);
++extern void cluster_unintern (struct cluster_list **);
+ 
+ /* Transit attribute prototypes. */
+-void transit_unintern (struct transit *);
++void transit_unintern (struct transit **);
+ 
+ /* Below exported for unit-test purposes only */
+ struct bgp_attr_parser_args {
+-- 
+2.11.0
+

package/quagga/0007-bgpd-security-debug-print-of-received-NOTIFY-data-ca.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,114 @@
+From 9e5251151894aefdf8e9392a2371615222119ad8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Paul Jakma <paul@jakma.org>
+Date: Sat, 6 Jan 2018 22:31:52 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] bgpd/security: debug print of received NOTIFY data can
+ over-read msg array
+
+Security issue: Quagga-2018-1550
+See: https://www.quagga.net/security/Quagga-2018-1550.txt
+
+* bgpd/bgp_debug.c: (struct message) Nearly every one of the NOTIFY
+  code/subcode message arrays has their corresponding size variables off
+  by one, as most have 1 as first index.
+
+  This means (bgp_notify_print) can cause mes_lookup to overread the (struct
+  message) by 1 pointer value if given an unknown index.
+
+  Fix the bgp_notify_..._msg_max variables to use the compiler to calculate
+  the correct sizes.
+
+Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
+---
+ bgpd/bgp_debug.c | 21 ++++++++++++---------
+ 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/bgpd/bgp_debug.c b/bgpd/bgp_debug.c
+index ba797228..43faee7c 100644
+--- a/bgpd/bgp_debug.c
++++ b/bgpd/bgp_debug.c
+@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ Software Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place - Suite 330, Boston, MA
+ #include "log.h"
+ #include "sockunion.h"
+ #include "filter.h"
++#include "memory.h"
+ 
+ #include "bgpd/bgpd.h"
+ #include "bgpd/bgp_aspath.h"
+@@ -73,7 +74,8 @@ const struct message bgp_status_msg[] =
+   { Clearing,    "Clearing"    },
+   { Deleted,     "Deleted"     },
+ };
+-const int bgp_status_msg_max = BGP_STATUS_MAX;
++#define BGP_DEBUG_MSG_MAX(msg) const int msg ## _max = array_size (msg)
++BGP_DEBUG_MSG_MAX (bgp_status_msg);
+ 
+ /* BGP message type string. */
+ const char *bgp_type_str[] =
+@@ -84,7 +86,8 @@ const char *bgp_type_str[] =
+   "NOTIFICATION",
+   "KEEPALIVE",
+   "ROUTE-REFRESH",
+-  "CAPABILITY"
++  "CAPABILITY",
++  NULL,
+ };
+ 
+ /* message for BGP-4 Notify */
+@@ -98,15 +101,15 @@ static const struct message bgp_notify_msg[] =
+   { BGP_NOTIFY_CEASE, "Cease"},
+   { BGP_NOTIFY_CAPABILITY_ERR, "CAPABILITY Message Error"},
+ };
+-static const int bgp_notify_msg_max = BGP_NOTIFY_MAX;
++BGP_DEBUG_MSG_MAX (bgp_notify_msg);
+ 
+ static const struct message bgp_notify_head_msg[] = 
+ {
+   { BGP_NOTIFY_HEADER_NOT_SYNC, "/Connection Not Synchronized"},
+   { BGP_NOTIFY_HEADER_BAD_MESLEN, "/Bad Message Length"},
+-  { BGP_NOTIFY_HEADER_BAD_MESTYPE, "/Bad Message Type"}
++  { BGP_NOTIFY_HEADER_BAD_MESTYPE, "/Bad Message Type"},
+ };
+-static const int bgp_notify_head_msg_max = BGP_NOTIFY_HEADER_MAX;
++BGP_DEBUG_MSG_MAX (bgp_notify_head_msg);
+ 
+ static const struct message bgp_notify_open_msg[] = 
+ {
+@@ -119,7 +122,7 @@ static const struct message bgp_notify_open_msg[] =
+   { BGP_NOTIFY_OPEN_UNACEP_HOLDTIME, "/Unacceptable Hold Time"}, 
+   { BGP_NOTIFY_OPEN_UNSUP_CAPBL, "/Unsupported Capability"},
+ };
+-static const int bgp_notify_open_msg_max = BGP_NOTIFY_OPEN_MAX;
++BGP_DEBUG_MSG_MAX (bgp_notify_open_msg);
+ 
+ static const struct message bgp_notify_update_msg[] = 
+ {
+@@ -136,7 +139,7 @@ static const struct message bgp_notify_update_msg[] =
+   { BGP_NOTIFY_UPDATE_INVAL_NETWORK, "/Invalid Network Field"},
+   { BGP_NOTIFY_UPDATE_MAL_AS_PATH, "/Malformed AS_PATH"},
+ };
+-static const int bgp_notify_update_msg_max = BGP_NOTIFY_UPDATE_MAX;
++BGP_DEBUG_MSG_MAX (bgp_notify_update_msg);
+ 
+ static const struct message bgp_notify_cease_msg[] =
+ {
+@@ -150,7 +153,7 @@ static const struct message bgp_notify_cease_msg[] =
+   { BGP_NOTIFY_CEASE_COLLISION_RESOLUTION, "/Connection collision resolution"},
+   { BGP_NOTIFY_CEASE_OUT_OF_RESOURCE, "/Out of Resource"},
+ };
+-static const int bgp_notify_cease_msg_max = BGP_NOTIFY_CEASE_MAX;
++BGP_DEBUG_MSG_MAX (bgp_notify_cease_msg);
+ 
+ static const struct message bgp_notify_capability_msg[] = 
+ {
+@@ -159,7 +162,7 @@ static const struct message bgp_notify_capability_msg[] =
+   { BGP_NOTIFY_CAPABILITY_INVALID_LENGTH, "/Invalid Capability Length"},
+   { BGP_NOTIFY_CAPABILITY_MALFORMED_CODE, "/Malformed Capability Value"},
+ };
+-static const int bgp_notify_capability_msg_max = BGP_NOTIFY_CAPABILITY_MAX;
++BGP_DEBUG_MSG_MAX (bgp_notify_capability_msg);
+ 
+ /* Origin strings. */
+ const char *bgp_origin_str[] = {"i","e","?"};
+-- 
+2.11.0
+

package/quagga/0008-bgpd-security-fix-infinite-loop-on-certain-invalid-O.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+From ce07207c50a3d1f05d6dd49b5294282e59749787 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Paul Jakma <paul@jakma.org>
+Date: Sat, 6 Jan 2018 21:20:51 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] bgpd/security: fix infinite loop on certain invalid OPEN
+ messages
+
+Security issue: Quagga-2018-1975
+See: https://www.quagga.net/security/Quagga-2018-1975.txt
+
+* bgpd/bgp_packet.c: (bgp_capability_msg_parse) capability parser can infinite
+  loop due to checks that issue 'continue' without bumping the input
+  pointer.
+
+Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
+---
+ bgpd/bgp_packet.c | 4 ++--
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/bgpd/bgp_packet.c b/bgpd/bgp_packet.c
+index b3d601fc..f9338d8d 100644
+--- a/bgpd/bgp_packet.c
++++ b/bgpd/bgp_packet.c
+@@ -2328,7 +2328,8 @@ bgp_capability_msg_parse (struct peer *peer, u_char *pnt, bgp_size_t length)
+ 
+   end = pnt + length;
+ 
+-  while (pnt < end)
++  /* XXX: Streamify this */
++  for (; pnt < end; pnt += hdr->length + 3)
+     {      
+       /* We need at least action, capability code and capability length. */
+       if (pnt + 3 > end)
+@@ -2416,7 +2417,6 @@ bgp_capability_msg_parse (struct peer *peer, u_char *pnt, bgp_size_t length)
+           zlog_warn ("%s unrecognized capability code: %d - ignored",
+                      peer->host, hdr->code);
+         }
+-      pnt += hdr->length + 3;
+     }
+   return 0;
+ }
+-- 
+2.11.0
+